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 Comparing Orbánism and Gaullism 
The Gaullist Physiognomy of Orbán’s 
Post-2010 Hungary* 
 
ESZTER PETRONELLA SOÓS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
After 1989, Hungarian politicians rarely referred to France as a model. 
However, the right wing Hungarian government instated in 2010, the politicians 
and intellectuals around the governing party Fidesz ‒ Alliance of Young 
Democrats, frequently refer to French Gaullism as a source of inspiration. This 
may either mean that 1) Gaullism and the political figure/work of de Gaulle 
serve as example to be followed by Hungarian politicians; 2) or that they are 
simply instrumentalized to the benefit of Fidesz. 
 When forming his government in 2010, Viktor Orbán stated that the 
Hungarian situation was similar to France in 1958, because both countries 
suffered from a leadership crisis1. In early 2012, Viktor Orbán referred to de 
Gaulle as a role model, while also mentioning the concept of “grandeur 
nationale” so dear the famous French president2. In October of the same year, 
without however mentioning the French case, Orbán elaborated on the idea of 
leadership, claiming that a presidential system would be perhaps more able to 
cope with difficult reforms and decisions than a parliamentary one3. Viktor 
Orbán is not the only member of government to refer to de Gaulle or to the 
French case: in August 2012, then Vice-Prime Minister Tibor Navracsics also 
emphasized the similarities between the Hungarian situation and de Gaulle's 
                                                          
*  This paper is based on a communication delivered on occasion of the 2012 Budapest 
Conference of the Central European Political Science Association (CEPSA). I would like 
to thank all the colleagues (including the anonymous peer reviewers) who contributed to 
its elaboration either by asking questions or by providing critical insight during the 
edition of the text. Your contribution is very much appreciated. All remaining faults and 
errors are mine. 
1
 Quoted by: Tibor Svárkonyi, “A magyar de Gaulle”, Népszava.hu, 1 June 2010, 
http://www.nepszava.hu/articles/article.php?id=304282. (Downloaded: 23 January 2014.) 
2
  Balázs Gabay, Levente Bucsy, „Orbán: Ezek a vádak nem méltók Európához”, mno.hu, 
18 January 2012, http://m.mno.hu/belfold/orban-ezek-a-vadak-nem-meltok-europahoz-
1044517. (Downloaded: 10 June 2012.) 
3
 INDEX & MTI, “Orbán: Az elnöki rendszer alkalmasabb a reformokra”, index.hu, 10 October 
2012, http://index.hu/belfold/2012/10/10/orban_az_elnoki_rendszer_alkalmasabb_a_refo 
rmokra/. (Downloaded: 6 November 2012.) 
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France during the 1950s, their common characteristic being the rapid setting up 
of a new political system4. In December 2012, when students filled the streets of 
Budapest, protesting against the education reform of the government, a debate 
about the similarities between 2012 Hungary and 1968 France was engaged in 
the blogosphere and the press5. Last but not least, the de Gaulle-Orbán 
comparison received international coverage, most notably on the pages of the 
French Le Monde newspaper6. 
 This paper asserts that indeed Gaullism is a viable analogy for better 
understanding the nature of Orbánism, not because the latter is a Hungarian 
version of the former, but because the similarities and differences between them 
can serve a better understanding of Orbánism. Is Gaullism the genuine source of 
inspiration for Victor Orbán and his party in government, or is it only a piece of 
a party identity-building strategy? We will not really address this question here, 
which calls for a thorough qualitative inquiry on Hungarian politics. Instead, we 
will use the comparison for heuristic purposes. 
 At first glance, there are striking similarities between the two political 
movements: the accession to power during a period of crisis, the political 
weakness of the predecessors, the personal charisma of the leader, the high 
importance given to the nation and to preserving its sovereignty, a sovereignist 
conception of the European Union, a tendency to make use of discretionary 
executive power, the accusations of systemic authoritarianism. These 
similarities are sufficient reasons for engaging in a deeper comparative analysis. 
This paper aims makes the first steps in this direction. 
 Firstly, we will define Gaullism for comparative purposes. Secondly, 
we will clarify what post-2010 “Orbánism” is. Third, we will draw up the first 
elements of a comparison between Gaullism and Orbánism, and between de 
                                                          
4
 HVG.HU & MTI, “Navracsics: Sólyom Lászlónak sem lehettek kétségei”, hvg.hu, 18 August 
2012, http://hvg.hu/itthon/20120818_Navracsics_Solyom_Laszlonak__sem_lehettek. 
(Downloaded: 23 January, 2014.) 
5
 See: Zsolt Bayer, “Kultúrkampf”, Magyar Hírlap, 18 December 2012, http://www. 
magyarhirlap.hu/kulturkampf. (Downloaded: 3 June 2013); JOTUNDER, “Bayer 
fenyegeti a diákokat”, Örülünk, Vincent?, 18 December 2012, 
http://orulunkvincent.blog.hu/2012/12/18/bayer_fenyegeti_a_diakokat. (Downloaded: 3 
June 2013); András Földes, “Bayer Zsolt már Orbán lemondását jósolja?”, Képviselő 
Funky, 18 December 2012, http://kepviselofunky.blog.hu/2012/12/18/bayer_zsolt_ 
mar_orban_lemondasat_josolja. (Downloaded: 3 June 2013.) and Eszter Petronella Soós, 
“Hogy is volt az az 1968?”, Francia politika, 19 December 2012, http://franciapolitika. 
blog.hu/2012/12/19/94_hogy_is_volt_az_az. (Downloaded: 3 June 2013). 
6
 Yves-Michel Riols, “La posture gaullienne de Viktor Orban”, Le Monde, 12 April 2013, 
http://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2013/04/12/la-posture-gaullienne-de-viktor-
orban_3159069_3214.html. (Downloaded on 29 January 2015.) and “Viktor Orban, 
l'imposture gaullienne?”, Le Monde, 25 April 2013, http://mediateur.blog.lemonde.fr/ 
2013/04/25/viktor-orban-limposture-gaullienne/. (Downloaded: 29 January 2015.)  
Comparing Orbánism and Gaullism 
 
Romanian Political Science Review ? vol. XV ? no. 1 ? 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
93
Gaulle's France and Orbán's post-2010 Hungary. Finally, we will examine the 
merits and the limits of the analogy. 
 
 
Gaullism: A Certain Idea of France  
 
Historians7 showed that Gaullism is a dynamic movement and an 
ideology “compatible with many practices”8. The General himself was very 
pragmatic when it came to policies. For instance, de Gaulle was often 
considered an anti-American and an anti-British politician. If President de 
Gaulle was reluctant to postwar US dominance, General de Gaulle stood firmly 
on the side of the Allies during the war and even considered the possibility of a 
French-British union in 1940 to be able to continue the war against the Third 
Reich9. The same goes for his allegedly anti-European policies (like the famous 
“empty chair crisis”), when in truth, the European Community was undoubtedly 
developing and consolidating during his presidency. His writings are full of pro-
European opinions and positions10. Some historians argue based on such 
changes and discrepancies, rightly so, that the policies of de Gaulle vary with 
history. 
 For René Rémond's classical work, Les droites en France11, Gaullism 
illustrates one tradition of French right-wing thought stemming from doctrines, 
styles and movements like Bonapartism. To mention some similarities between 
Gaullism and Bonapartism, Bonapartism asserts that parties divide the nation 
instead of unifying it, and therefore they are to be exceeded12. Bonapartism is 
also authoritarian and anti-parliamentarian, and tries to create a direct 
relationship with the people by passing around parties13, which is undoubtedly 
true in the case of Gaullism, too. Rémond, though, underlines the fact that no 
100% identification is possible.  
 On the other hand, authoritarian or anti-parliamentary propensities are 
not exclusive to the Bonapartist-Gaullist tradition: anti-parliamentarian feelings 
                                                          
7
 For example: Serge Berstein, Histoire du gaullisme, Éditions Perrin, Paris, 2012. 
8
 Serge Berstein, Histoire…cit., p. 7. 
9
 See: Charles de Gaulle, Háborús emlékiratok, Gondolat, 1973 and Jean Lacouture, de 
Gaulle, Éditions du Seuil, Paris, 1969. 
10
 On this topic, see for instance: Charles de Gaulle, Mémoires d'Espoir, Plon, Paris, 1999; 
Krisztina Arató, Boglárka Koller, Európa utazása. Integrációtörténet, Gondolat Kiadó, 
Budapest, 2009 and András István Türke, Charles de Gaulle Európa-politikája. Az 
európai integráció konföderatív alternatívája, Europa Varietas Institute, Budapest, 
http://varietas.visuart.eu/charles_de_gaulle_europa_politikaja. (Downloaded: 21 October 
2013.) 
11
 René Rémond, Les droites en France, Aubier, Paris, 1982. 
12
 Ibidem, p. 107. 
13
 Ibidem, p. 110. 
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were common among French intellectuals and politicians, especially in the 
inter-war era14. This is the era when not only right-wing Orléanists like André 
Tardieu, but also left-wing politicians like Léon Blum called for a stronger 
executive power15. Thus, Gaullism revived older political traditions that were 
not inherent to the Parliament-centered Republican culture16, but its anti-
parliamentarism and its will to create a strong executive cannot be considered as 
its differentia specifica. It is not surprising then that there are scholars and 
followers who define Gaullism, using the very words of de Gaulle himself, as a 
“certain idea of France”, the ideal of French grandeur, or as a special approach 
to political power, meaning a strong executive, lead by the President who also 
has a direct relationship with the electors. Some others identify Gaullism with 
the superior interest of France, or as a set of values focused on foreign policy 
and the international status of the nation17. Serge Berstein, who wrote an 
extensive study about the history of Gaullism, also broke the concept down to 
its “periods”, talking about a wartime Gaullism, the Gaullism of the RPF era, 
Gaullism in power, neo-Gaullism etc. Analyzing Gaullism by its periods is very 
logical, as it facilitates the understanding of its pragmatism and its variable 
nature. 
 “Variable” does not mean, though, that Gaullism is an unstable 
ideology: the General’s vision was quite constant throughout the decades. De 
Gaulle had a clear set of ideas and values by the time he began his political 
journey: he was already 50 years old in 1940, the moment of the symbolic kick-
off of his career. He was a field officer, whose strategic thinking revolved 
around adaptability18. He knew that in order to carry out a strategic goal, tactics 
might vary according to the marge de maneouvre and to the tools at hand: this 
military thinking, which is rarely stressed, is the cornerstone of Gaullism, for it 
explains the “discrepancies”. For de Gaulle, political power (and the strong 
executive itself) was a mere tool for the strategic goal: the grandeur of France. 
Of course, he also needed a few conditions to be met, but these conditions were 
also subordinated to the strategic goal19. According to Serge Berstein, these two 
factors are the ones that are permanently present in Gaullism: the idea of a great 
                                                          
14
 About French intellectuals and their political ideas see: Tony Judt, Befejezetlen múlt. A 
francia értelmiség 1944-1956, XX. Századi Intézet, Budapest, 2008. 
15
 Tony Judt, Befejezetlen múlt…cit.; René Rémond, Les droites…cit., p. 192; and 
Zsuzsanna Boros, Rendszerváltozások Franciaországban, L'Harmattan, Budapest, 2011. 
16
 See for instance: François Furet, Mona Ozouf, “Préface”, Le siècle de l'avènement 
républicain, Gallimard, Paris, 1993, pp. 7-22. 
17
 For possible definitions see: Jean-Christian Petitfils, Le Gaullisme, Presses Universitaires 
de France, Que sais-je?, Paris, 1981. 
18
 See for instance: Charles de Gaulle, Le fil de l'épée, Librairie Plon, Paris, 1971. 
19
 Gaullism, its goals, conditions and tools are explained by Jean-Christian Petitfils, Le 
Gaullisme, cit. 
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and an independent France, assured by a strong executive, headed by a quasi 
monarchic President20.  
 
 
What is Orbánism? 
 
The personal influence of Viktor Orbán on Fidesz' is tremendous: he is 
the most important factor that keeps the party together. Due to the fact that this 
symbiosis is a widely known phenomenon, we will henceforward use the term 
“Fidesz” as the equal of “Orbánism” and vice versa21.  
 There are numerous works on the history of Fidesz22, on Viktor Orbán 
himself23, and we can even find a study or two on Fidesz political values and 
narratives24. But if one wants to explore “Orbánism”, or the ideology of Fidesz 
in its entirety, one has to face difficulties. At first, the most apparent attribute of 
“Orbánism” is its extreme variability: contemporary historiography rightly 
points out Fidesz’ and Orbán’s evolution from liberalism to right-wing 
populism, going through national liberalism25. 
 Fidesz started out as a generational liberal party at the time of the 
Hungarian transition. The party began to shift to the right around 1993-1994, 
when the other liberal party, the SZDSZ (Alliance of Free Democrats) started to 
cooperate with the post-communist Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP). This 
strategic move was all the more justified by the collapse, in 1994, of the then-
largest party of the right, József Antall's MDF (Hungarian Democratic Forum). 
The new Fidesz dubbed itself Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Party (Fidesz-MPP) and 
phrased its messages for the “citizens”. This national-liberal turn lasted until 
2002, when the MSZP-SZDSZ coalition ousted the Fidesz-MDF-FKgP 
coalition from government with the electoral promise of a “social transition”. 
From then on, Fidesz adopted a more populist approach, going as far as to 
promise a 14th month pension to senior citizens in 2006. 
                                                          
20
 Serge Berstein, Histoire…cit., p. 511. 
21
 By the way, “Orbánism” is a practically non-existent word in Hungarian politics. As 
Hungarian political science has not explored the ideology of Fidesz and Orbán in a 
comprehensive research project, the use of the term Orbánism refers to “Orbán-style 
politics”, and its use is for convenience. 
22
 For example: Attila Wéber, A Fidesz-jelenség, Napvilág Kiadó, Budapest, 1996 and Edith 
Oltay, Fidesz and the Reinvention of the Hungarian Center-Right, Századvég Kiadó, 
Budapest, 2012. 
23
 József Debreczeni, Orbán Viktor, Osiris Kiadó, Budapest, 2002. 
24
 Examples: Ildikó Szabó, “A nemzet fogalmi konstrukciója a Fidesz diskurzusaiban 1998 
és 2006 között”, Politikatudományi Szemle, no. 3, 2007, pp. 129-159; Idem, 
“Rendszerváltás és nemzeti tematika”, Politikatudományi Szemle, no. 2, 2005, pp. 89-110; 
Márton Szabó (ed.), Fideszvalóság. L'Harmattan Kiadó, Budapest, 2006. 
25
 For a comprehensive history of Fidesz see: Edith Oltay, Fidesz…cit. 
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 The history of Orbán's Fidesz is the history of 25 dynamic years. For 
heuristic purposes, we call Orbánism the post-2010 era, precisely the moment 
when noticeable Gaullist references appear in Fidesz’ discourse. The limits of 
our analogy have to be clearly stated from the very beginning: while Gaullism 
is a consistent political resource, “Orbánism” is a very evasive target that does 
not have yet the benefit of the historical perspective.  
 In matters of foreign policy Viktor Orbán himself defined his political 
vision as a military one26. Should we take this at face value? What is the 
strategic goal of Fidesz politics, how to define and operationalize the “interests 
of the Hungarian people” so dear to Fidesz politicians? Opponents often 
depicted de Gaulle as a genuine Machiavellian figure (going so far as to treat 
the 1958 constitutional change a coup d'État), and only time could soften or 
change this perception. Will it be the case for Fidesz as well?  
 Last but not least, our inquiry makes use of a diachronic political 
comparison. Therefore, similarities and discrepancies between the terms 
compared have always to be considered in their own context: what might have 
been considered as progressive in 1958, might be considered very conservative 
in the 2010s. 
 
 
SEVEN CHARACTERISTICS OF GAULLISM 
AND THEIR PRESENCE 
IN ORBÁN'S POST-2010 HUNGARY 
 
National Grandeur and the Importance of Foreign Policy 
 
National grandeur is an explicitly stated goal for both de Gaulle and 
Orbán. De Gaulle's opinion on the matter is well-known: “France cannot be 
France without greatness”. According to the Wikileaks cables, Orbán told U.S. 
diplomats that “it's not complicated – we are telling the people that we will 
restore the nation's greatness”27. The political messages and statements are 
similar, indeed, even if Orbán uttered his message in front of a relatively 
restricted public, while de Gaulle wrote it down very publicly. But their 
motivations and the political opportunities available to them differ dramatically. 
 The idea of French grandeur is more than a simple national idea. It aims 
at influencing humanity in its entirety and being an important international 
power. Ever since the Enlightenment, France was in the front line of cultural 
                                                          
26
 HVG.HU, “Orbán: “az én filozófiám katonai természetű””, Hvg.hu, 30 May 2013, 
http://hvg.hu/itthon/20130530_Orban_az_en_filozofiam_katonai_termeszetu. 
(Downloaded: 30 May 2013.) 
27
 08BUDAPEST391, https://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/04/08BUDAPEST391.html 
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and political innovation in the Western world. France’s ambition for influence 
demands more than the idea of a respectable, independent nation. In the 20th 
century, Gaullism's major dilemma stemmed from the fact that France seemed 
to have lost the means to exercise its role as a great power – re-requiring these 
means would therefore be in the center of all Gaullian efforts28. De Gaulle never 
turned or argued against the Western world, even when he deemed it necessary 
to conduct an independent foreign and defense policy. 
 In turn, Viktor Orbán recurrently argues that the Western world is in 
decline (a common conservative motive since Oswald Spengler's The decline of 
the West). Orbán says that Hungary has to be in phase with “the Eastern winds” 
that blow. With this argument, he revives an ancient Hungarian debate about 
Hungary as a ferryboat-country that floats between East and West but never 
anchors anywhere29. When it comes to Hungary’s foreign policy orientation 
Orbán has in mind not only economic or political interests of the country, but 
also values. In 2014, in a widely criticized speech delivered at the annual 
Summer School held in Băile Tuşnad, Romania, Orbán didn’t hesitate to 
criticize Western liberal values claiming that “the new state that we are 
constructing in Hungary is an illiberal state, a non-liberal state”, stating that 
“the most popular topic in thinking today is trying to understand how systems 
that are not Western, not liberal, not liberal democracies and perhaps not even 
democracies, can nevertheless make their nations successful. The stars of the 
international analysts today are Singapore, China, India, Russia and Turkey. 
And I think that our political community recognised and touched on this 
challenge correctly several years ago”30. The difference is crucial. While 
harshly criticizing French politics under the 3rd and the 4th Republics, de Gaulle 
never gave up on the democratic ideals of his era or on democracy per se and 
never tried to look for foreign, even less for Eastern political models. 
 This topic can only be interpreted in conjunction with Hungarian 
history and Central-European identity problems. For nations in Central and 
Eastern Europe, what was really at stake was not the regional influence or 
power, but the mere existence as a nation-state. Historians like István Bibó31 or 
Jenő Szűcs32 strongly underlined the differences between Western and Eastern 
                                                          
28
 See: Jean-Christian Petitfils, Le Gaullisme, cit. 
29
 Concerning this metaphor, see Tamás Csapody, “Kompország politikusai: Koppányok és 
Szent Istvánok. A kompország és a Koppány-politikai metafora  elemzése”, 
Politikatudományi Szemle, no. 1, 2006, pp. 179-200 and particularly p. 187. 
30
 Viktor Orbán, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s Speech at the 25th Bálványos Summer Free 
University and Student Camp, http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-
minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-orban-s-speech-at-the-25th-balvanyossummer-
free-university-and-student-camp. (Downloaded: 25 January, 2015.) 
31
 István Bibó, A kelet-európai kisállamok nyomorúsága. Argumentum Kiadó – Bibó István 
Szellemi Műhely, 2011, p. 80. 
32
 Jenő Szűcs, “Vázlat Európa három történeti régiójáról”, Helyünk Európában. Nézetek és 
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Europe as regards to nations' greatness and state resilience, explaining that 
Eastern European nations always suffered from an existential fear, exhibiting 
often an antidemocratic nationalism33. On the contrary, as noticed by Serge 
Berstein, General de Gaulle created the bases of a democratic, Republican and 
“modern French nationalism”34.  
Some also argue that foreign policy is extremely important for both 
Orbán and De Gaulle We should not spend much time with arguing that de 
Gaulle considered foreign policy as the most important policy of all35. Ervin 
Csizmadia suggested mutatis mutandis the same for Viktor Orbán's Fidesz36, by 
saying that a “European vision” became a very important point for the post-
2010 Fidesz, because adversaries have no such vision – and that this is one of 
the main reasons why Fidesz and Orbán could remain so popular.  
 Let us accept the argument that both movements consider foreign 
policy as (some sort of) an identity-building priority. In this case, we must 
acknowledge that they cannot use identical methods for acquiring the means for 
such an international policy. One could argue that stressing the benefits of a 
“Hungarian-owned economy”, a clear goal for the Fidesz government, is an 
attempt at acquiring the necessary means. However, in military terms, Hungary 
relies heavily on NATO's defense capacities, which is, strictly speaking, an 
unequivocal constraint on national sovereignty. In contrast, de Gaulle knew that 
international influence and French-style “grandeur” are not possible without a 
totally independent defense capacity37. Hungary has nor the means, neither the 
ambition to become a great nuclear power, and, as a Central European middle-
sized country, its margin for maneuver is very limited. The “West is in crisis” 
argument, though, might be able to hide the geopolitical realities of the region. 
Is it what Bibó called the “deformation of the political character”, meaning that 
there is no balance between the real, the possible and the desirable38?  
 This is my central argument against the equals sign between Orbánism 
and Gaullism. Hungary exercised the role of great power once, but has not done 
so for a few hundred years (or not without external help, like that of the 
Hapsburg), whereas France has always been a great power. Even today, as a full 
member of the Security Council of the UN, France is among the five most 
                                                                                                                                              
koncepciók a 20. századi Magyarországon (2. kötet), Magvető Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 
1986, pp. 515-568. 
33
 István Bibó, A kelet-európai kisállamok nyomorúsága…cit., p. 83. 
34
 Serge Berstein, Histoire…cit., p. 45, pp. 57-63, pp. 293-297 and p. 396. 
35
 See: Krisztina Arató, Boglárka Koller, Európa utazása…cit.; Ferenc Gazdag, 
Franciaország története 1945-1995, Zrínyi Kiadó, Budapest, 1996; and Charles de 
Gaulle, Mémoires d'Espoir, Plon, Paris, 1999. 
36
 Ervin Csizmadia, A tusnádfürdői ív, http://www.meltanyossag.hu/node/2422. 
(Downloaded: 21 October 2013.) 
37
 Jean-Christian Petitfils, Le Gaullisme, cit. 
38
 István Bibó, A kelet-európai kisállamok nyomorúsága…cit., p. 88. 
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influential states in the international system. Thus, though both movements 
have special regards towards foreign policy, we also understand that their 
political opportunities are different.  
 As Béla Bíró explained, Central and Eastern European nationalisms 
should not be analyzed with the same lenses as Western nationalisms. For Bíró, 
civic and liberal nationalism is the narrative of dominant groups, while cultural 
nationalism is the claim of marginalized groups. This should explain why 
France offers the best illustration of the former and Central-Eastern Europe is 
predominantly exhibiting the latter39. Moreover, solid, resilient Western nations 
are more preoccupied by strengthening democracy, while that is not the case in 
Hungary: only the national issue could serve as a stabilizing factor for 
prevailing Hungarian political systems in frequent times of crises40. Moreover, 
republican traditions are not yet an inherent part of Hungarian political culture41 
as as it is the case in France42. 
 
 
Anti-Liberalism, Populism and “Etatisme” 
 
The critique of the free-market economy is a clear similarity between 
Gaullism and Orbánism, along with anti-communism and the appeal to social 
unity. For instance, the Hungarian Constitution (art. XVII. [1]) stresses the need 
for employers and employees to cooperate in order to ensure a sustainable 
national economy. During the postwar reconstruction and during his presidency, 
“workers' participation” was an idea dear to de Gaulle as well. How far this 
similarity goes? 
 According to Pierre Rosanvallon, anti-liberalism43 is part of the core of 
the French political culture. By virtue of a Jacobin tradition, French are attached 
to the idea of a state which in the framework of a democratic polity, is the 
organizer of social and/or economic progress44: even those politicians will 
willingly use the powers of the state who are otherwise considered as “liberals” 
                                                          
39
 Béla Bíró, “A nemzet mítoszai”, Politikatudományi Szemle, no. 1-2, 2004, pp. 223-231.  
40
 Ildikó Szabó, “Rendszerváltás és nemzeti tematika”, cit., pp. 95-96. 
41
 Ibidem. 
42
 Sudhir Hazareesingh, „‘Who Belongs to the French Republic, and to Whom does it 
Belong?’”, European Journal of Political Theory, no. 3, 2004, pp. 473-480, 
http://ept.sagepub.com/content/3/4/473.extract. (p. 475.) 
43
 Pierre Rosanvallon, “A francia „illiberalizmus” alapjai és problémái”, in Idem, Civil 
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(like former president Nicolas Sarkozy, who, in his Testimony proudly describes 
his interventions to market processes as the economic minister of President 
Chirac45 proudly recalls his strategies of economic intervention while he was 
minister of the Economy under Chirac presidency)  
 Anti-liberalism, at least in the economic sense, is also an important 
feature of Hungarian political culture. The legacy of socialism is long lasting 
when it comes to social expectations towards the state. The majority of 
Hungarian citizens prefer left-wing economic policies46, but at the same time, 
they are quite mistrustful vis-à-vis the state. Fidesz was well aware of this 
ambivalence when it began to incorporate a social agenda (after 2002-2003) 
into its program47. 
 What are the differences then? This is an issue where readers should be 
very much aware of the diachronic nature of our comparison. Orbán and de 
Gaulle, in a manner of speaking, reflect the expectations and the values of the 
era they belong to, all the while responding to electoral expectations and 
internal and external economic pressures. De Gaulle's epoch was the era of 
rebuilding, of (mostly) Keynesian economics and of the construction of 
Western welfare states. While de Gaulle indeed had to “accept necessary 
austerity measures” or liberal policies, the economic environment of his time 
was dubbed Trente Glorieuses and it was consistent with his personal ideas and 
beliefs. On the other hand, Orbán serves as PM in an era of deep economic 
crisis, when Keynesian economics and the concept of the welfare state have 
long since been displaced by the neoliberal paradigm. Globalization and the rise 
of neoliberalism in the 80s create a special environment for a capitalizing 
country in transition like Hungary. 
 Not only the historical setting, but also religious-cultural differences 
have to be taken into account when drawing a comparison between de Gaulle’s 
and Orbán’s policies. While Gaullism is inspired by a Catholic social culture, 
Fidesz (and Orbán himself) is part of a Protestant one. We do know that these 
religious differences might have a strong impact on the economic vision of 
(political) actors48, therefore they are worthy of attention.  
 De Gaulle was and remained a right-wing politician attached to both 
Christian and social values49, even when, for example, he accepted the 
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necessary austerity measures in 195850. De Gaulle is widely considered as 
having played a crucial role in the creation of the postwar French welfare state 
after World War II.  
 While Fidesz used a populist, left-wing social discourse while in 
opposition, its economic policy in government is – from an ideological point of 
view – quite complex. The “unorthodox economic policy” of Orbánism is a 
mixture of neo-liberal elements (flat tax, severe cuts in social security, total 
delegation of social responsibilities to local governments, austerity in the 
education system), populist elements (administrative cuts in household 
expenses) and state intervention (transformation of markets through regulation, 
nationalizations, creation of state monopolies, like in the case of the “national 
tobacco shops”). Strictly speaking, while Gaullism, in an era of economic 
growth, urged to the creation of the French welfare state, Orbánism, in an era of 
economic crisis, strove to dismantle the elements of the Hungarian welfare 
state.    
  
 
Antiparliamentarism 
 
Both de Gaulle and Orbán51 seem to think that they have a personal 
legitimacy that is independent from parliamentary parties, that is valid even 
when they are in opposition or out of (party) politics (Considering his role 
played during the war, de Gaulle qualifies for a charismatic leader). But – 
contrary to de Gaulle or subsequent Gaullist movements – Fidesz is defining 
itself and it is defined by its leader52 as a political party. In this context, but 
within these limits, antiparliamentarism and the need for a strong executive is 
another trait that might bring together Fidesz and Gaullism. The 1958 French 
and the 2012 Hungarian constitutions are both institutional responses to 
political crises. 
 Viktor Orbán’s response is not as coherent as de Gaulle’s: it does not 
widen the margin for maneuver of the executive as de Gaulle’s reform did, 
mostly because the new Hungarian basic law makes frequent use of the two-
thirds super-majority rule (for instance, the creation and modification of income 
tax brackets necessitate a two-thirds super-majority in Parliament). In fact, the 
“Westminsterization” of the Hungarian politics is not the result of the 
constitutional revision, but merely the circumstantial outcome of the strong 
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parliamentary support the current government enjoys53. If the government does 
not hold this majority, the Parliament (and the opposition) regains its influence, 
even under the new basic law. Moreover, the new Hungarian electoral system is 
highly ambiguous: according to researchers, it is more disproportionate then the 
previous one54, and according to political analysts, a steady, 5-6 % lead in the 
popular vote might easily lead to a two thirds majority55. If that is the case, the 
long term Westminsterization of the Hungarian political system is a clear 
possibility, but the constant destabilization and redrafting of the political system 
is not that unrealistic either – such a solution would be the exact contrary to 
what de Gaulle wished in France. 
 One can also argue that both de Gaulle and Orbán tried to limit the 
capacity of independent bodies to control the action of the government. 
However, the direction is different: in 1958, within the parliament-centered 
French political culture, the creation of the Constitutional Council was 
nevertheless a step toward strengthening and widening the separation of 
powers, while in post-2010 Hungary, the Constitutional Court was stripped of 
many of the prerogatives it held previously. 
 
 
Charismatic Leadership and Direct Democracy 
 
Both Orbánism and Gaullism try to create a direct link with the people 
while circumventing the Parliament, and offer the solution of the homme 
providentiel. Both the French and Hungarian political cultures are keen on 
strong leaders. In Hungary, the communist dictator János Kádár is still one of 
the most popular political figures of the 20th century56. According to a poll 
conducted in 2013 in France, 87% of respondents said that the country needed a 
strong leader to make order57. Thus, the image of a strong de Gaulle and of a 
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strong Viktor Orbán, communicating directly with the people, is not alien to 
these political cultures. 
 However, the differences are significant. Most importantly, Orbán 
makes frequent use of “popular consultations”58, while de Gaulle combined the 
recourse to politically and legally binding referendums with a continuous 
personal presence among the citizens59. The intent may be the same, but the 
consequences are not. Referenda are verifiable consultations; Orbán's national 
consultations are not. Referenda have a clear legal status and legally 
rationalized political consequences, consultations are often fluid. Let us 
remember that de Gaulle used referendums and general elections in order to 
strengthen and renew his legitimacy, and once he lost a referendum – in 1969 – 
he stepped down. In Hungary, Fidesz used referenda only for tactical reasons, 
when in opposition, like in 2008, in order to gain momentum or to stall 
government decisions or reforms. 
Traditionally, Fidesz is not an adept of direct democracy. Of course, 
Rousseauism may have its disciples in Hungary too, but they do not count 
among Fidesz politicians60. Traditionally, Fidesz favors parliamentary 
sovereignty, governmentalism61, majority decision-making, but not two-thirds 
majority consensus politics. (Of course, should Fidesz lose an election and 
retain at least 1/3 of parliamentary votes, Fidesz most probably will insist on 
consensual policy-making and the two-thirds super-majority rules will force the 
government in office to cooperate with Fidesz.) Moreover, the new Hungarian 
constitution makes it more difficult for political forces to initiate a successful 
referendum, as the participation threshold for successful referenda has been 
increased to 50% of all voters (former rules stipulated that a referendum is 
equally successful if 25% of all voters vote in one direction, regardless of 
participation level). 
  
 
Legality and Legitimacy 
 
Gaullist and Maurassist ideologies often stress the opposition between 
the pays légal and the pays réel – that is, the formal-legal political legitimacy 
vs. the charismatic-traditional type of legitimacy62. In de Gaulle's case, this was 
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never a radical opposition63: when he failed to acquire a formal democratic 
legitimacy on occasion of a referendum he himself initiated, somewhat 
unnecessarily, he stepped down. 
 Fidesz also often contrasts legality and legitimacy. One illustrative 
instance is the party's discourse during the 2006 political crisis or later political 
declarations about the “illegitimate” Gyurcsány government64. In 2002, Orbán 
declared in a widely-cited speech that the mother country cannot be in 
opposition. Some even argue that Fidesz promotes a transcendental vision of 
history65, as a fight between good and bad. News articles or news reports 
sometimes throw light on the origins of this political eschatology. For instance, 
Viktor Orbán said in late 2013 that he and his party feel the need to introduce 
detailed policy provisions in the constitution – rules that are not usually to be 
found in the constitutions –, in order to prevent a future socialist government to 
change them when in power66. This practically means that Fidesz is willing to 
limit the effect of a democratic election in order to ensure that its policies are 
maintained in the long term. In another parliamentary speech, Orbán added that 
in the 1980s he did not fight dictatorship, but the communists, that is the 
predecessors of the current socialists67, thus blurring the line between adversity 
and political competition. 
 Moreover, Fidesz often refers to the Socialist Party as a political party 
who serves foreign interests (Moscow, Brussels), – de Gaulle thought the same 
about the communists (the difference is that Hungarian socialists might see 
“Brussels” as a reference, but they are not controlled by it – while the PCF was 
directly controlled by Moscow). In turn, contrary to what de Gaulle did in 1958, 
when he overtly limited the possibility of a communist victory by creating the 
absolute majority electoral system, we should not forget that Fidesz did not 
make the victory of the MSZP impossible, even if the new electoral system 
favors the biggest party in the country, which is currently the Fidesz. 
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New Constitutions and their Legitimacies 
 
Both politicians and political movements want(ed) to reshape their 
countries in terms of politics, institutions and international role. Both politicians 
had the possibility to do so. For instance, both of them created and offered a 
new constitution to their country. One is already proven to be stable and long 
lasting. On the other, the jury is still out. 
 The Gaullian system is based on a wider legitimacy than Viktor Orbán's 
new Constitution, as de Gaulle made sure that a binding referendum be 
organized to validate the text. This is why François Mitterrand accusation of a 
coup d’État didn’t stand against the 1958 Constitution, nor did the allegations 
against the famous 1962 referendum on the direct election of the president: no 
constitutional interpretation could outrank the democratic judgment of the 
electorate and therefore the Constitutional Council did not opposed the entry 
into force of the direct election of the president68. 
 In turn, the legitimacy of the constitution of Viktor Orbán is solely 
based on the legitimacy of a parliamentary vote, which is in turn based on an 
outstanding electoral victory in 2010. While the legality and the parliamentary 
legitimacy cannot be debated, it does not prevent opposition parties from 
criticizing the new Constitution as the constitution of one party (as we've seen, 
without a two-thirds majority, a socialist government's room for manoeuvre 
would be severely limited by the new constitution). Therefore, the constitution of 
Viktor Orbán is much more vulnerable than the constitution of the 5th Republic. 
Should he lose an election, the new government, the new majority might say that 
the legitimacy of the constitution is void because now the people (the electorate) 
want something else69. Of course, 2015 is just the fourth year of the life of the 
new Hungarian constitution: again, we have no historical distance to know 
whether there will be a Hungarian François Mitterrand to make peace with it. 
 
 
Approaches to History 
 
Perhaps the greatest difference between Gaullism and Orbánism is their 
approach to history. Gaullism is a highly intellectual ideology, with a deep 
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historical perspective. Charles de Gaulle, according to all of his biographies and 
to his own writings, considered French history in its entirety70. For him, Clovis, 
Louis XIV, the revolution of 1789, Robespierre, Napoleon and the 3rd Republic 
were equally part of the nation's history. Being born to a family with a clear 
royalist sensibility, de Gaulle seems to have saddened his mother with the fact 
that he accepted the republican political system as such71. In fact, de Gaulle 
refused to enter the debates between the “two nations”, that is the debate 
between monarchists and Republicans. His Constitution refers to the Revolution 
and the preamble of the 1946 Constitution, while his political system is the 
synthesis of the will of “both nations”. Of course, his synthesis covers up the 
fact that he believed in one united and undivided nation that is capable of doing 
and achieving great things in history. In France, there is a consensus when it 
comes to big issues like the Revolution, the Republic, and since de Gaulle, there 
is an institutional framework that is an acceptable synthesis to almost every 
relevant political actor. Since the 1981 election of François Mitterrand, we 
might call this synthesis the Republican compromise72. The Republic in France 
has a widely-accepted normative connotation, elevating it to the level of 
“common national values”. Under such circumstances, the debate of the “two 
nations” seems to be an issue of the past: the Republic has not only a 
consensual form of government, but a common set of values that penetrated the 
public as well as the private sphere73. 
 In turn, Hungary is unable to demonstrate such a compromise 
concerning the national issue and the past is not closed in terms of common 
knowledge and interpretation74. Not only politicians, but even scholars argue 
that the “nation” as used by Fidesz until 2003 was a notion that excluded those 
who were not voters of Fidesz. The party later demonstrated a wider 
interpretation of the “nation” in order to rise above other parties75. Fidesz 
politicians frequently call their opponents traitors and accuse them of 
representing foreign interests76. (However, this is also circumstantial: the 
foreign policy of Fidesz is being criticized as “too pro-Russian” since the 
beginning of 2014, the outbreak of the Ukrainian conflict, therefore those 
harmful foreign interests, as represented by opposition forces, mostly mean 
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“Brussels” and “Washington” in contemporary Fidesz discourse, because 
Moscow would be too controversial to evoke.) 
 Fidesz is more likely to “pick” things out in Hungarian history and put 
them on a pedestal, like the Holy Crown or Horthy's regime, and is more likely 
to approach the idea of nation in an exclusive manner. The preamble of the new 
basic law is an example of that vision of history. We are not only talking about 
rejecting certain dictatorial epochs but whole political traditions in Hungarian 
history. Therefore, the approach of Fidesz to history is different from the 
synthetic Gaullian approach. Orbánism is not a synthesis, it clearly takes its 
stand in the debate of the “two nations”.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
During our analysis, all “striking” and “visible” similarities turned out 
to be differences as well, clearly suggesting that an analogy does not mean 
identity. The “example” and the “instrumentalization” hypotheses (or a 
combination of them) are therefore all potentially admissible. The comparison 
of Orbán's and de Gaulle's attitudes towards democracy, parliamentarism, 
referenda, majority decision making, super-majority voting and legitimacy is 
particularly useful for a better understanding of the functioning of the new 
Hungarian political system and the democratic attitudes of Fidesz, including its 
subtle and not so subtle attempts at limiting the room for maneuver of any next 
government. 
 A further comparative analysis has to focus on four important 
questions. First, we have to clearly determine the notion of systemic crisis, 
work on the theoretical relationship between regime change and “crisis”, and 
define the differences between the pre-1958 France and the pre-2010 Hungary. 
Second, the political culture of Hungary and France often show similar traits 
regardless of Gaullism and Orbánism. For instance, both political cultures 
welcome strong leaders. This is a similarity that needs to be explained and 
described in details. Third, both movements should be contextualized even 
more when compared: the relationship of Gaullism with the Republican idea of 
France and the relationship of Fidesz with the Hungarian conservative tradition 
cannot be forgotten. Fourth, Viktor Orbán's Fidesz is not the only movement 
that is compared to de Gaulle and Gaullism. For instance, Vladimir Putin's 
Russia has also been compared to de Gaulle's France from different aspects77. 
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The Gaullist analogy, might be interesting in the case of the semi-presidential 
Romania as well. Explaining why Gaullism is such a popular comparative basis 
in the Central and Eastern Europe, might be another important step towards a 
better understanding politics in the region. 
 
